On April 30, 2026, the Financial institution of Ghana (BoG) launched its 2025 audited monetary statements. By legislation, these needed to be authorized by the Council and submitted to the Minister of Finance by the tip of March. It wasn’t.
The financial institution granted a one-month extension, citing the necessity for time to just accept the books, partially as a result of it modified auditors from Deloitte to KPMG. It additionally required further scrutiny relating to gold operations and the Financial institution’s publicity to the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod).
The assertion was authorized on April 29 and revealed on Could 1, narrowly lacking the secondary authorized publication deadline.
This determine dropped like a bomb in Ghana’s polarized political setting. Because it was revealed that BoG had posted a web loss, $1.25 billion This 12 months, the opposition NPP started to hunt blood. (Quantities used all through the textual content are topic to sure change fee assumptions and should differ barely from these in my earlier social media posts.)
Additional studying reveals further $1.55 billion In different complete earnings expense, complete complete loss decreased as a result of accounting influence of a decline within the native forex worth of central financial institution greenback belongings held abroad as a result of appreciation of the Cedi. $2.8 billion. Collected detrimental capital (a “gap” within the BoG’s capital base) has been reached ~$9 billion The closing value on the finish of 2025 elevated from $3.99 billion in the identical interval final 12 months. Unfavorable capital as a share of GDP is about 8% (relying on how exactly you estimate the related GDP indicators). This is likely one of the largest such positions reported by any central financial institution on this planet and has been for a number of years. It is a huge deal.
Three forces have introduced us right here. Every has an enchanting story to inform.
again to fundamentals
Earlier than trying on the numbers, it is useful to grasp the essential mechanics of central financial institution actions that create these losses. It is not very difficult, however it could possibly rapidly change into complicated.
Step 1: Create funds to purchase gold
Ghana is a big producer of gold. In reality, it’s Africa’s largest producer. The Financial institution of Ghana needs this gold as a result of it may be offered for {dollars}, that are extraordinarily beneficial in Ghana because the greenback typically dries up and depreciates the cedi. There, the financial institution pays the miners cedis and receives their gold. However you do not have infinite cedis sitting in your secure. Sometimes, you “create” what you want from nearly nothing. These CEDIs exist the second a financial institution deposits a GoldBod aggregator account for future funds to miners.
In 2025, the Financial institution bought roughly 2.9 million high-quality ounces of Dore gold in a sequence of transactions at a mean market value of roughly $7.6 billion. A lot of the funds used to pay for that cash had been created within the method described above.
Step 2: Convert gold to {dollars}
Dore’s gold is shipped to LBMA-certified refineries the place it’s processed into investment-grade “bullion” and both held as reserve belongings or offered on worldwide markets. In 2025, the Financial institution offered 869,915 ounces of refined bullion for about $3.6 billion and likewise offered roughly 2.9 million ounces of dore beneath its reserve program. {Dollars} stream into Ghana’s overseas change reserves. Because of this, overseas change reserves elevated from roughly $6.5 billion at the start of 2024 to $13.8 billion by the tip of 2025, the very best level in Ghana’s monetary historical past.
Step 3: Clear Cedis
However there is a pitfall I have been speaking about for months. The cedis created in step 1 are actually circulating within the economic system. If left unchecked, banks will lend, companies and households will spend, demand will outstrip provide, and costs will rise. inflation. The Financial institution’s principal mission is to stop simply that. Subsequently, the federal government must get better these cedis as a lot as potential.
That is achieved by issuing short-term payments to industrial banks (merely put, you borrow cash from banks and deposit cash with them). A financial institution arms over $8 million value of cedis to the Financial institution of Ghana. The board provides the financial institution a bit of paper (IOU) promising to repay the mortgage with curiosity inside 14, 28, or 56 days. Money is locked up. This course of is known as Sterilizationthe IOU is known as an open market operations (OMO) invoice.
By the tip of 2025, the financial institution will ~$9 billion Of this quantity, the quantity excellent on a closing value foundation is almost thrice the $2.22 billion excellent in the identical interval final 12 months.
Step 4: Pay curiosity by yourself borrowings
These OMO payments carry rates of interest at or close to financial coverage charges starting from 27% to 21.5% by way of most of 2025. The World Financial institution paid $1.34 billion in curiosity to industrial banks for the privilege of borrowing again the Cedis it had created. Though these charges have fallen considerably, there isn’t any assure that they may stay this fashion within the medium time period.
Step 5: Compound losses
The Financial institution’s earnings from all sources, together with curiosity on securities portfolios, commissions, and overseas change transactions, amounted to roughly $1.01 billion in 2025 (excluding the one-time sale of a big portion of Ghana’s gold reserves). Sterilization prices alone had been $1.34 billion. Provides working bills of $507 million, gold program lack of $724 million, and different bills. Whole working bills amounted to $3.03 billion in comparison with complete working earnings of $1.78 billion. The distinction, or annual loss, was $1.25 billion.
This loss additional worsens the inventory’s already considerably detrimental place. Every time this cycle repeats, the opening will get deeper.
| in easy-to-understand phrases The Financial institution of Ghana runs a three-step operation: (1) prints cedi to purchase gold, (2) sells gold for {dollars} to extend reserves, and (3) borrows again the printed cedi at excessive rates of interest to stop inflation. Though this operation achieves the strategic goals of report reserves (contributing to the energy of the cedi) and decrease inflation, the monetary prices exceed the Financial institution’s revenues. |
The Financial institution of Ghana is working diligently on “coverage solvency”, a measure of whether or not working income cowl the prices of major goals. Please word {that a} BoG is completely different from a industrial financial institution. We’re not attempting to make a revenue for our shareholders. It could be adequate to have the assets to implement financial coverage, together with to stop inflation and the depreciation of the cedi from getting out of hand.
The central financial institution reviews a coverage solvency surplus of $440 million in 2025. Particulars are defined under.
| merchandise | 2025 (hundreds of thousands of {dollars}) | 2024 (hundreds of thousands of {dollars}) |
| Curiosity acquired | 677 | 525 |
| Internet revenue from FVPL merchandise | 90 | 74 |
| Charges and prices | 56 | 33 |
| Different working earnings | 190 | 28 |
| Internet revenue from sale of refined gold | 766 | – |
| Whole working earnings | 1,779 | 660 |
| OMO price | (1,338) | (604) |
| coverage fee surplus | 440 | 56 |
Supply: Financial institution of Ghana 2025 Monetary Statements
A more in-depth look reveals that the core enterprise hasn’t modified a lot, reflecting the numerous enhance in income.
After subtracting a one-time achieve of $766 million from promoting half of the nation’s gold reserves, the Financial institution recorded a coverage solvency shortfall of roughly $326 million.
Core present revenues equivalent to curiosity, charges and buying and selling income had been nicely under the price of squeezing the cedi out of the system to stabilize the change fee and management inflation. Coverage solvency was achieved solely by the Financial institution liquidating roughly half of its gold holdings in non-repeatable transactions.
Questionable gadgets in “Different working earnings”
The one different line merchandise that differs considerably from 2024, the ‘different working earnings’ line, raises all kinds of issues. It jumped from about $28 million in 2024 to about $190 million in 2025, a rise of about six instances. The monetary statements reveal that roughly $172 million of this quantity is a reimbursement from the Treasury for “charges and prices incurred in reference to the allocation of Ghana’s particular drawing rights from the IMF.”
It is every kind of eyebrow-raising. Based on the Financial institution’s personal accounts, the full curiosity price from the IMF and SDR allocations was $35.6 million in 2025 (Be aware 11 to the Monetary Statements: GHS444.8 million). If the precise SDR-related prices had been $35.6 million, on what foundation did the Division reimburse $172 million, practically 5 instances the said prices?
The IMF’s SDR allocations got to international locations amid the coronavirus pandemic. A well-functioning economic system sometimes doesn’t contact the SDR. Nevertheless, the scenario in Ghana from 2021 to 2023 was removed from regular. Data present that Ghana accrued $172 million in curiosity on its roughly $1 billion IMF SDR allocation in 2025 because it exhausted its SDRs and struggled to rebuild its holdings. This corresponds to greater than 17% of the quantity.
This quantity is meaningless as a result of the IMF’s rate of interest on SDR allocations ranges from zero (if the nation doesn’t spend the allocation) to three% to 4% for the related interval. The quantities proven within the monetary statements as repayments from the central authorities to the BoG for processing curiosity funds on behalf of Ghana don’t add up in any respect. It’s greater than justified by its said function alone.
The central financial institution’s monetary statements describe this as a reimbursement based mostly on “established cost-sharing preparations”, however don’t present particulars on how will probably be calculated or the cumulative prices to be recovered. If this fee contains arrears from the earlier 12 months, the background will not be talked about within the memo. The BoG seems to be utilizing accounting gymnastics to extend income to be able to understate its coverage solvency deficit (i.e. not incomes sufficient income to cowl its core features).
unsettled gold receivables
British banks’ “different belongings” additionally jumped from $771 million in 2024 to $2.51 billion at closing charges in 2025. Though the monetary statements don’t present adequate line-by-line breakdown to elucidate this soar, concurrent reporting signifies that a good portion displays unsettled greenback earnings from the reserve gold program. Below this technique, industrial banks that obtain gold or gold-linked overseas change allocations and haven’t settled them by the tip of the 12 months will generate receivables to the central financial institution.
Nevertheless, roughly $1.2 billion of receivables stay unpaid from this system’s counterparties, elevating questions on each counterparty danger inside the Home Gold Buy Program (DGPP) channel and whether or not the Financial institution’s reported reserve place nonetheless contains illiquid receivables.
The Financial institution of Ghana creates the forex (Ghana Cedi) through which its debt is denominated, so it doesn’t undergo losses like common industrial banks.
Central banks can, and a few do, function as going concern even when their capital is detrimental. The Czech Nationwide Financial institution has had detrimental capital for the seventeenth consecutive 12 months because of enormous overseas change losses brought on by its overseas change intervention program. Chile, Israel, Mexico, and Slovakia have all skilled intervals of detrimental capital whereas implementing efficient financial insurance policies. The Reserve Financial institution of Australia reported that quantitative easing had a capital detrimental influence of A$12.4 billion in 2023, and whereas there was no disruption to operations, there have been related bond losses.
However it is a essential qualifier. The truth that a central financial institution can survive with detrimental capital doesn’t imply that it’s costless, can survive indefinitely, or in any institutional context.
5 components that negatively influence BoG’s detrimental capital scenario on Ghana
1. “Sterile” generally is a treadmill. The annual loss implies that the financial institution spent extra cedi than it collected. These additional cedis flowed into the economic system. To stop inflation, banks should sterilize them. You will need to difficulty extra OMO payments, you will incur extra curiosity, you will incur extra losses, and you may want extra sterilization. Efficient compounding cycle. With OMO debt excellent at GHF93.6 billion (roughly $8.5 billion) and a coverage rate of interest of round 15%, annual curiosity alone quantities to roughly $1.12 billion. If the gold program continues to inject liquidity and OMO inventory continues to develop, the curiosity invoice will enhance with it, even when rates of interest fall. It’s because the bottom is increasing sooner than rates of interest are contracting.
2. Passive forex creation. Central banks that spend greater than they earn create cash as a byproduct of their price construction. One greenback of working loss is equal to 1 greenback of latest cedi that entered the economic system and not using a corresponding withdrawal. In 2025, the Financial institution’s $1.25 billion loss is equal to a forex achieve of about 1% of GDP. What we’re speaking about is a structural inflationary impulse that banks need to sterilize at additional price. If you happen to’re not cautious, you possibly can find yourself in a harmful spiral.
3. Unfavorable carry within the portfolio. The financial institution borrows at Ghanaian rates of interest (15-27%) and earns return on belongings at a mixture of restructured home coupons (suppressed by DDEP) and worldwide rates of interest (4-5%). The result’s mismatches which might be deeply embedded within the material of Ghana’s economic system. So long as Ghana’s danger premium retains home rates of interest nicely above international charges, the Financial institution’s portfolio will bleed. No quantity of effectivity measures or cost-cutting applications can clear up issues which might be structurally rooted within the nation’s time period construction.
4. Seigniorage is shrinking. The central financial institution’s theoretical protection in opposition to losses depends closely on “seigniorage” (income from issuing interest-free banknotes). As Ghana’s economic system turns into extra digital (for instance, as cellular cash transactions start to dwarf bodily money), the proportion of transactions settled in paper forex will decline. Each time a transaction strikes from money to cellular cash, the financial institution’s seigniorage base diminishes, quietly eroding a income stream that might make losses moot.
5. Consolidated monetary place deteriorated. Central banks and governments are each a part of the general public sector. The Financial institution of Japan’s annual loss is a “quasi-fiscal” deficit. It is a fancy method of claiming that as a result of the central authorities remains to be the backstop, public spending that doesn’t seem within the authorities funds remains to be the duty of the federal government.
The IMF program targets a authorities major funds surplus of 1.5% of GDP. Nevertheless, if the World Financial institution had been to run a sub-fiscal deficit of 1% of GDP on the identical time, the general public sector place could be weaker than the important thing fiscal figures counsel. These shadows can’t be ignored ceaselessly.
The central financial institution and the Ministry of Finance signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on January 6, 2025, committing the federal government to step by step recapitalize the central financial institution from 2026 to 2032. The Ghana Banking Act was amended (Act 1158) to extend the minimal licensed capital from $1 million to $100 million (right here, US$1 = GHS 10) and create a proper framework for presidency necessities. Capital injection inside 90 days of the Board’s request.
Within the present scenario, the calculation seems merciless. Roughly $9.1 billion is required to revive fairness from roughly $9 billion under to the brand new statutory minimal of plus $96 million. Unfold over six years, that is about $1.5 billion a 12 months. This corresponds to about 8 % of the federal government’s complete annual income, or about 1.2 % of annual GDP.
Is that this reasonable? Think about competing calls for on the identical finance.
Monetary reconstruction. The IMF program requires a major steadiness surplus of 1.5% of GDP. In 2024, the federal government missed this goal by 3.8 share factors. That is primarily because of ministries accumulating GHF68.8 billion ($4.8 billion) in commitments exterior the GIFMIS system. We now see a hyperlink primarily to election-related infrastructure spending. Within the 2024 audit, 12.5% of those payables had been disqualified because of procedural deficiencies. Any recapitalization that will increase public debt would run counter to the federal government’s IMF debt discount targets, significantly the goal of decreasing public debt to 47% of GDP by 2030.
Financial institution recapitalization. On the identical time, the federal government is recapitalizing state-owned industrial banks by way of the Ghana Monetary Stability Fund, which has already disbursed GH¢5.2 billion (roughly $365 million) in bonds.
The power sector is in arrears. Collected money owed to impartial energy producers and gas suppliers quantity to billions of {dollars} over the medium time period. A brand new gas tax was launched in 2025, however its yields will solely cowl a small portion of the annual shortfall.
Infrastructure and social spending. The brand new authorities is working to enhance social safety, trainer coaching and well being infrastructure. One other huge push. All of those are politically non-negotiable.
There are indications that the federal government intends to handle the recapitalization by issuing non-tradable bonds. Such bonds don’t contribute to operational profitability and easily handle the fairness perspective. Central banks will nonetheless have to generate sufficient income from different sources to cowl sterilization prices, and governments will bear the fiscal prices of upper debt.
A basic stress: Each cedi in recapitalization bonds will increase the very public debt that IMF applications are designed to cut back. This results in very tough orders.
GANRAP: Future dangers of the gold program
The Home Gold Buy Program (DGPP) has been rebranded because the Ghana Accelerated Nationwide Reserve Accumulation Program (GANRAP). Till the central financial institution can work out an efficient non-public sector resolution, it’ll proceed to sterilize the ensuing liquidity by primarily utilizing the newly created cedi to purchase domestically produced gold, changing it to financial gold or promoting it for {dollars}.
Though the DGPP has promoted reserve accumulation, the monetary prices are vital and are structurally constructed into this system design.
| 12 months | Internet loss ($ million) | Gold earned (tons) | Reserve influence ($ billion) | Implicit sterilization ($ million)* |
| 2022 | ~9 | 3.5 | +0.2 | ~20 |
| 2023 | ~125 | 37 | +1.6 | ~400 |
| 2024 | ~398 | 56 | +2.5 | ~900 |
| 2025 | ～724 | 111 | +7.3 | ～2,400 |
| cumulative | ~1,256 | ～208 tons | +11.4 | ～3,720 |
.
The continued operation of GANRAP entails 4 structural dangers.
value hole. The financial institution buys the dore on the market value however information it on the official fee. The unfold between the 2, which displays refining losses, analytical charges, GoldBod company charges, and offtake reductions, constitutes a everlasting working loss. The financial institution has indicated that unit costs are being lowered beneath GANRAP, however has not revealed a revised payment and expense schedule.
Sterile operation. Shopping for gold domestically injects roughly 12.50 gigawon per greenback into the economic system (on the common fee in 2025). Sterilizing this quantity at a fee of 15% would price the financial institution 1.88 GH Francs per 12 months, or $0.15 per $1 of reserves acquired. Through the two-year holding interval between gold being refined and saved in banks, sterilization prices alone eat 30 % of the greenback worth of reserve income. Central banks that purchase overseas change reserves by buying {dollars} with current CEDI holdings or by receiving IMF disbursements will incur a fraction of this price. We must also not overlook the truth that the complete equipment is extremely depending on the value of gold. If the value of gold halved, twice the quantity of cedi could be required to realize the identical change management impact. with critical compounding results.
GoldBod Counterparty Publicity. The Financial institution’s particular publicity to GoldBod, an middleman for artisanal small-scale gold purchases, will not be individually disclosed within the monetary statements. The IMF’s Fifth ECF Evaluation discovered that losses from handicrafts and small-scale gold buying and selling amounted to $214 million. We now know that general publicity was greater than 4 instances that quantity. Whereas the Gold-for-Oil program (which used gold gross sales to finance oil imports) was discontinued in March 2025 following gathered losses, the G4R program continues beneath a brand new label with the identical middleman construction.
Reducing marginal income. Ghana’s reserves are $13.8 billion, equal to five.7 months’ value of imports. Every greenback added to the reserve step by step reduces the insurance coverage worth. Going from one month to 3 months of protection is a giant change. At 5-6 months, sterilization prices stay fixed, however marginal advantages are small. Persevering with to build up on the fee of 2025 would end in diminishing strategic advantages and prices in extra of $1 billion yearly. And now there may be discuss of increasing protection to fifteen months based mostly on giant month-to-month gold purchases. A scenario that considerably expands the distribution channel of gold – sterilization prices are incurred, the chance price of assets tied up in reserves that earn minimal curiosity is considerably elevated, all resulting in very modest insurance coverage advantages.
Various decrease price approaches
The Financial institution of Ghana’s methodology of accumulating overseas change reserves – home gold purchases financed by cash creation and sterilized at home rates of interest – is likely one of the costliest approaches potential. A number of options present related or higher outcomes at decrease financial price.
1. Require gold royalty funds to be made in variety relatively than money. Massive mining corporations presently pay royalties in cedis. If a extra significant slice is paid in refined gold delivered on to banks’ reserve accounts, banks shall be buying gold with out creating home liquidity. Gold arrives already purified, so there aren’t any sterilization prices. Disadvantages: Requires authorized reform and renegotiation of mining agreements. Firms will resist this as a result of it will take away flexibility in once they pay royalties. It is an concept value exploring additional.
3. Gold purchases are made by way of fiscal brokers relatively than central banks. If the Ministry of Finance (or a authorities asset company) makes use of current budgetary assets to buy gold and transfers it to banks, the liquidity injection will come from already budgeted fiscal spending relatively than new cash creation. Banks will obtain gold with out printing cedis, fully eliminating sterilization prices. Disadvantages: Requires fiscal area that governments don’t presently have, creating completely different types of fiscal and financial entanglement.
4. Decelerate the tempo of accumulation. Ghana’s reserves cowl 5.7 months of imports and are already above normal sufficiency standards. Lowering the tempo of home gold purchases by 50% would lower sterilization prices in half whereas conserving reserves above a snug degree. Disadvantages: Politically tough. Gold applications are in style, enrich home capitalists, and are in step with sentiments of useful resource nationalism. GoldBod, the mining neighborhood, and aggregators are all sturdy supporters.
5. Creatively restructure the complete gold channel. We lately described a “trustchain” mannequin that might transfer GoldBod from being a nationwide dealer to a regulator of a clear and aggressive gold community. Non-public or semi-private financiers fund the aggregators, a number of patrons compete for the gold, shares are broadly auctioned, and dangers equivalent to value, purity, change, and logistics are explicitly allotted relatively than being dumped into the BoG. The proposed mannequin preserves the advantages of reserve funding whereas decreasing subsidies, opacity, and public steadiness sheet losses by way of real-time traceability, revealed benchmarks, auditing, and danger diversification.
The political and financial obstacles to all these choices are formidable. DGPP/GANRAP has created a home ecosystem of aggregators, brokers, transporters, and small-scale miners that rely on steady central financial institution purchases. GoldBod itself is a comparatively new establishment and has some natural momentum. Delaying or restructuring this system would incur concentrated losses to those teams whereas distributing diffuse advantages (decrease inflation danger and central financial institution losses) throughout the overall inhabitants.
If you’re aware of catanomics idea, you additionally know that that is exactly the political dynamic that makes reform tough in any democracy. Merely, Necessary coverage targets That is to function a countervailing pressure in opposition to the politically unemployed and vested pursuits.
So long as the cedi stays steady and inflation is contained, indifference to the scenario will prevail.
Lastly, the essential points to trace are:
inflation danger. A sterile treadmill creates a possible growth reservoir. The OMO invoice of CHF93.6 billion will finally mature. When banks are unable to roll over the cedi, both as a result of they demand larger yields or as a result of the shares have change into too giant relative to the demand within the banking system, the cedi returns to the economic system in giant portions. In 2025, OMO inventory represented roughly 34% of broad cash (M2+). An uncontrolled unwinding of even 1 / 4 of this inventory would launch sufficient liquidity to trigger inflation to flare up once more.
Borrowing prices will enhance. Industrial banks, which earn risk-free returns of 15-25% on OMO payments (as coverage charges get better), have little incentive to lend to companies and households at comparable rates of interest. Why would small companies tackle credit score danger when the central financial institution ensures their returns? OMO’s guide shuts out private credit score. If OMO inventory stays inflated, lending charges to companies and households will probably stay elevated.
Deserted authorities spending. Each cedi that the federal government in the end transfers to recapitalize banks is a cedi that’s not spent on colleges, hospitals, roads, and social safety. If carried out, the recapitalization MOU would end in an annual stream of $1.3 billion (roughly equal to Ghana’s complete well being capital expenditure in 2024) from the Treasury to the World Financial institution’s steadiness sheet over seven years. If the MOU will not be fulfilled, the Financial institution’s detrimental fairness will proceed and the dangers described above will enhance.
Forex vulnerabilities. In 2025, CEDI appreciated by 41% in opposition to the greenback. This has resulted in exceptional efficiency because of sturdy overseas change reserves, excessive actual rates of interest, and improved investor confidence. Nevertheless, this rally, which overshot to the OVERVALUED forex, has been partially supported by the very OMO operations which might be financially unsustainable for the World Financial institution. If the central financial institution is pressured to chop again on sterilizations (as a result of prices are too excessive), the surplus cedi will chase the greenback and the forex will reverse its energy. A 20% decline from present ranges would erase the buying energy good points skilled by Ghanaian households in 2025, resulting in larger costs for imported meals and gas. By tenaciously and dogmatically defending overvalued currencies for too lengthy, central banks have solidified their expectations to an unrealistic degree.
Seen in isolation, the Financial institution of Ghana’s detrimental capital will not be the disaster that partisan commentary suggests. Central banks should not industrial banks. They don’t face chapter within the conventional sense. Their mandate is value stability and monetary system integrity, each of which the Financial institution measurably achieved in 2025. Inflation fell to five.4% (inside goal vary for the primary time since 2021), reserves reached a historic excessive, the banking sector returned to surplus, and the cedi had the strongest fee of appreciation amongst rising market currencies.
What we must be involved about is the sustainability of the working fashions which have produced these outcomes. The financial institution misplaced $1.25 billion to realize these targets. Solvent coverage was achieved solely by way of a one-off operation of disposing of half of the gold reserves. Core working earnings was $326 million under sterilization prices. OMO’s debt inventory has tripled in a single 12 months. The recapitalization plan depends on a authorities that has by no means maintained fiscal self-discipline for seven consecutive years. And several other gadgets within the monetary statements (SDR redemptions, excellent G4R receivables, opacity of GoldBod publicity) counsel that the reported numbers could symbolize a extra favorable image than the underlying actuality warrants.
The gold program clearly has an influence when it comes to reserves. However as we have seen, it may be considerably improved.
Ghana’s economic system has absorbed extraordinary shocks since 2022, together with sovereign debt defaults, debt restructuring, forex collapse, and inflation exceeding 50%. The Financial institution of Ghana deserves some credit score for the indicators of restoration. However the company’s steadiness sheet has gathered stabilization prices that restrict its future flexibility.
If the following shock comes earlier than steadiness sheets are repaired, banks will face it with much less ammunition, much less reliability, and fewer room for maneuver than in 2022.
Nobody can say that the general public doesn’t want to fret about this.
